The Brahma Sutra · Book 2: Non-Contradiction

The book opens. The Samkhya opponent says, in the first book you refuted the pradhana, yet the Samkhya smriti of the sage Kapila is an authoritative shastra. It must be given its scope, and once the pradhana is denied as the cause, that smriti is left with no scope at all.

Badarayana answers. In sutra 2.1.1, if scope is given to your Samkhya smriti, then the fault arises that other smritis such as the Manu-smriti, the Yajnavalkya-smriti, and the Gita would be left without scope, since those smritis contradict it. The authority is shruti, and not smriti. In sutra 2.1.2, no other means of knowledge yields the pradhana either.

Shankara’s point is that where two smritis say opposite things, shruti alone decides. Shruti is the root authority, and smriti follows it. Only the smriti that agrees with shruti is to be accepted.

Context: this adhikarana follows up on the Ikshaty-adhikarana (1.1.5-11) of the first book.

Patanjali’s Yoga treatise too takes prakriti to be the root cause. Badarayana says, the reasoning of the previous sutra applies to Yoga as well. “एतेन योगः प्रत्युक्तः,” by this the Yoga smriti too is set aside.

Here “Yoga” refers to Patanjali’s Yoga system, not to ordinary meditation practice. Patanjali too held his prakriti to be insentient, following the very method of Samkhya.

Context: the Yoga Sutras of Patanjali, and in particular the section on devotion to Ishvara in the first pada. Patanjali does accept Ishvara, yet he does not take Ishvara to be the cause of prakriti. Badarayana’s refutation bears on this position.

The Samkhya objects: Brahman is conscious and the world is insentient. The two differ in nature. How can an insentient world come from a conscious cause?

Badarayana answers in turn. In sutra 2.1.4, the shruti word “तज्जलान्” (Chandogya 3.14.1) already proves that this comes forth from the conscious. In sutra 2.1.5, the world shows the same thing, as insentient things like hair and nails grow from a conscious person. In sutra 2.1.6, where a deity or a presiding self is spoken of, the sense is understood through the particular and the continuity. In sutra 2.1.7, this too is seen in the world. In sutra 2.1.8, should someone say the world is unreal, Badarayana denies it: the word “असत्” is only a negation, a way of denying an existence separate from its ground. In sutra 2.1.9, no contradiction remains even at the time of dissolution. In sutra 2.1.10, this understanding rests on the strength of the illustration. In sutra 2.1.11, the fault falls on the opponent’s own side, on Samkhya itself, since even in the Samkhya view the relation of prakriti and purusha cannot be established.

Context: Shvetashvatara 4.10 (“मायां तु प्रकृतिं विद्यात्”), where the ground of maya is Brahman itself, and Taittiriya 2.1, where space arises from the atman and everything from space.

The opponent says, we will establish Brahman as the cause by reasoning alone, so what need is there for shruti? Badarayana answers, relying on reasoning alone carries a fault, “तर्क-अप्रतिष्ठान।” Reasoning stays uncertain. For every logical claim a counter-argument is possible. If you depend on reasoning alone, then “अनिर्मोक्ष-प्रसंग,” meaning no settled path to liberation would ever hold firm.

For this reason, in Vedanta the highest authority is shruti, and reasoning is secondary. This is Badarayana’s position on the means of knowledge. The work of reasoning is limited to supporting the meaning of shruti, and it does not stand as an independent authority.

This is the most important adhikarana in the whole book. Badarayana declares, cause and effect are non-different, identical with each other. This is the foundation of the Advaita doctrine.

In sutra 2.1.13, the previous reasoning also refutes the objection based on the non-acceptance by the wise. In sutra 2.1.14, should someone say that the jiva’s status as enjoyer would apply to Brahman as well if the two were undivided, the answer is that even in the world, like the ocean and its waves, difference is seen within non-difference. In sutra 2.1.15, “तदनन्यत्व,” meaning the effect is non-different from its very cause, is proved by the word “आरम्भण” (Chandogya 6.1.4, “वाचारम्भणं विकारो नामधेयं मृत्तिकेत्येव सत्यम्”). This shows that everything is in truth the nature of the cause (clay), and the effect (the pot) is only a modification of name and form.

In sutra 2.1.16, the effect is found only where the cause is present. In sutra 2.1.17, the existence of the later effect, the one that comes after, already resides in the prior cause. In sutra 2.1.18, should someone say that “असत्” too is spoken of (Taittiriya 2.7, “असद्वा इदम् अग्र आसीत्”), Badarayana says this describes a “धर्मान्तर,” a state free of name and form, and the rest of the passage makes it clear. In sutra 2.1.19, reasoning and other shruti statements prove the same. In sutra 2.1.20, just as a cloth is only its threads, so too the world rests in Brahman alone.

Context: Chandogya Upanishad 6.1.4-7, where “वाचारम्भणं विकारो नामधेयम्” and the illustration of clay and the pot reveal the whole Advaita doctrine.

The opponent says, if cause and effect are non-different, then Brahman and the jiva are non-different too. Then the jiva’s suffering would be Brahman’s suffering, and Brahman would no longer be the benefactor of the jiva.

Badarayana answers. In sutra 2.1.22, “अधिकं तु,” Brahman is more than the jiva, and the Upanishads clearly point to a difference. Brahman is all-pervading, all-knowing, and all-capable, while the jiva is limited. In sutra 2.1.23, just as the fine particles within a stone do not carry the full quality of the stone, so too the difference between Brahman and the jiva holds from the standpoint of the limiting adjunct.

Shankara’s doctrine here is this: in their essential nature the jiva and Brahman are one, and they differ only through the limiting adjunct. This passage is the root of the later doctrine that the jiva and Brahman are one in essence, yet appear different in ordinary experience.

The opponent says, if Brahman itself becomes the world, then it would need instruments, the way a potter needs clay, a wheel, and a stick. Where does Brahman have these instruments?

Badarayana answers. In sutra 2.1.24, “क्षीरवत्,” just as milk turns into curd on its own, without any external cause, so too Brahman undergoes modification by itself. In sutra 2.1.25, “देवादिवत्,” in the case of the gods and the like too, the world offers examples of creation arising from oneself.

Context: Chandogya 6.2.3, “तदैक्षत बहु स्यां प्रजायेय,” Brahman itself willed, may I become many.

The opponent says, if Brahman becomes the world, does all of Brahman undergo modification, or only a part? If all of it, then no Brahman remains. If a part, then Brahman would have parts, which contradicts the Upanishad’s word that it is “निरवयव,” without parts.

Badarayana answers. In sutra 2.1.26, it is granted that both alternatives appear to carry a fault. In sutra 2.1.27, shruti is rooted in the word, and shruti says exactly this, so we do not decide the matter on the strength of reasoning alone. In sutra 2.1.28, “आत्मनि चैवं विचित्राः,” within the atman all these varied creations arise with no division into parts, the way a dream throws up a manifold creation without any separate material. In sutra 2.1.29, the same fault falls on the opponent’s own side as well, so this objection does not remain one-sided.

Shankara’s vivartavada is implicit here: Brahman does not truly transform, all of this is the appearance of name and form, and the clay in a clay pot stays exactly as it was.

The opponent says, Brahman has no instruments such as sense organs, so how will it make the world? Badarayana answers. In sutra 2.1.30, Brahman is “सर्वोपेत,” endowed with all powers. In sutra 2.1.31, should someone say Brahman is “विकरण,” meaning without sense organs, that has already been answered.

The opponent says, every action has some purpose. For what purpose did Brahman make the world? If there is some desire, then Brahman is not complete. And if there is no purpose at all, then why would it make the world?

Badarayana answers. In sutra 2.1.32, Brahman’s activity springs from no purpose, for it is aptakama, one whose every desire is already fulfilled. In sutra 2.1.33, “लोकवत् तु लीला-कैवल्यम्,” just as in the world a full and contented person plays only for the sake of play, with no purpose, so too the creation of Brahman is a lila, a play.

This is the root of lilavada, the doctrine of divine play. Creation is the natural overflow of fullness. It makes no attempt to fill any lack.

Context: Saundarya Lahari verse 1, “शिवः शक्त्या युक्तो यदि भवति शक्तः प्रभवितुम्।” Everything manifests through the play of Shiva and Shakti.

The most piercing objection comes here. One is born happy, another in sorrow, one wealthy, another poor. If Brahman is the cause of all, then the charge of partiality and cruelty falls upon it.

Badarayana answers. In sutra 2.1.34, Brahman is “सापेक्ष,” meaning it takes into account the past karma of living beings. Brahman is neutral, and every jiva reaps fruit according to its own karma, as shruti also shows. In sutra 2.1.35, should someone say that in the first creation there was no karma at all, Badarayana replies that the world is beginningless, and before every creation the karma of a prior creation was present. In sutra 2.1.36, both shruti and smriti confirm this very doctrine.

In this way the order of karma keeps the charge of partiality from falling on Brahman. Beginningless karma is the cause of the inequality of joy and sorrow, and Brahman only gives fruit according to karma.

Context: Bhagavad Gita chapter 9 (“समोऽहं सर्वभूतेषु न मे द्वेष्योऽस्ति न प्रियः”) and Katha 1.2.23 (“नायमात्मा प्रवचनेन लभ्यः”).

This is the conclusion of the first pada. In sutra 2.1.37, omniscience, omnipotence, all-pervasiveness, and justness, all these attributes settle harmoniously in Brahman. In sutra 2.1.38, shruti holds this same doctrine.

The pada opens. This is the case built against all the rival schools. First, the refutation of Samkhya.

The Samkhya claims that prakriti, the pradhana, though insentient, is made of the three gunas, and the world is fashioned from the imbalance of these three gunas.

Badarayana answers in turn. In sutra 2.2.1, “रचना-अनुपपत्ति,” so well-ordered a creation cannot be established from an insentient pradhana, and inference does not support taking the pradhana as the cause. In sutra 2.2.2, the purposeful activity seen in the world is not possible from an insentient pradhana. In sutra 2.2.3, should someone say that milk and water ripen on their own, even there a conscious overseer is required. In sutra 2.2.4, without a conscious cause the balance of the three gunas never breaks on its own.

In sutra 2.2.5, nowhere else is such purposeful creation seen to come from the insentient, and the illustration of grass and the like does not apply here. In sutra 2.2.6, even if it were granted, the purpose still cannot be established. In sutra 2.2.7, should someone say that iron moves near a magnet, or point to the illustration of the blind man and the lame man, even there a cause possessed of the power of knowledge is required. In sutra 2.2.8, the pradhana’s status as a principal member cannot be established. In sutra 2.2.9, inferring it in another way severs it from the power of knowledge. In sutra 2.2.10, your view holds mutual contradiction, so it is incoherent.

The Vaisheshika school of the rishi Kanada holds that the world is made of atoms. Two atoms join into a “द्व्यणुक,” three dvyanukas join into a “त्र्यणुक,” and by such growth, step by step, visible objects are formed.

Badarayana answers in turn. In sutra 2.2.11, when in the combination of atoms each atom is minute and spherical, that is, fine and round, then a great and long object, that is, gross and extended, cannot be formed from them, for the qualities of magnitude do not match. In sutra 2.2.12, there is no cause for how motion would first arise in the atoms, so action is absent. In sutra 2.2.13, accepting the relation of “समवाय,” inherence, leads to the fault of infinite regress. In sutra 2.2.14, if the atoms are eternal then the world too would be eternal, so how could there be creation and dissolution? In sutra 2.2.15, if you grant the atoms qualities such as form, then the reverse follows, their impermanence is established, since things possessing form are seen to be impermanent. In sutra 2.2.16, a fault arises either way. In sutra 2.2.17, the wise have not accepted this view, so it is utterly unworthy of regard.

The Sarvastivada of the Buddhists, the Vaibhashika and Sautrantika view, holds that everything is momentary, everything is new at every instant, an unbroken flow of arising and cessation. And there is anatmavada, meaning there is no lasting atman at all.

Badarayana answers in turn. In sutra 2.2.18, if the components are momentary, how would their “समुदाय,” their aggregate, form, since they perish before they can even combine. In sutra 2.2.19, the answer to “इतरेतर-प्रत्ययत्व,” that is, pratityasamutpada, dependent origination: it states only that one arises as the occasion for the next, and it gives no relation of existence. In sutra 2.2.20, the earlier one ceases before the next arises, so from what cause would the new one spring? In sutra 2.2.21, if the two coexist, the fault of “यौगपद्य,” simultaneity, follows, and if they do not, the thesis is contradicted. In sutras 2.2.22 through 2.2.25, incoherence is shown in the account of cessation and in the analysis of space. In sutras 2.2.26 and 2.2.27, even against the denial of the atman, “अनुस्मृति,” recollection, does its work, and recollection requires a lasting experiencer, which refutes momentariness.

The Vijnanavada of the Buddhists, the Yogachara view, holds that there is no external world at all, and everything is only vijnana, the movement of the mind.

Badarayana answers in turn. In sutra 2.2.28, the absence of external objects cannot be granted, since they are directly perceived. In sutra 2.2.29, “वैधर्म्य,” there is a clear difference between waking and dream experience: a dream is contradicted on waking, while waking experience is never contradicted. In sutra 2.2.30, without an external object, knowledge itself is never found to exist, since knowledge is always of some object. In sutra 2.2.31, the fault of momentariness has already been shown. In sutra 2.2.32, this view proves incoherent in every way.

The Jaina school’s “सप्तभंगी नय” views every thing in seven ways. Of one and the same thing it is said that it both is and is not.

Badarayana answers in turn. In sutra 2.2.33, mutually contradictory properties cannot belong to one and the same thing at once. In sutra 2.2.34, this view establishes the incompleteness of the atman, since the Jaina hold the atman to be the size of the body, which destroys its all-pervasiveness. In sutra 2.2.35, even granting “पर्याय,” successive modification, the contradiction is not removed, because of modification and the rest. In sutra 2.2.36, holding the atman to have a size in its final state forces one to hold both states to be eternal, and then nothing in particular is established.

The Pashupata school holds that “पति,” meaning Ishvara, is only the efficient cause and not the material cause. Prakriti, called “पशु,” is a separate, independent entity apart from it.

Badarayana answers in turn. In sutra 2.2.37, there is incoherence in this notion of “पति.” In sutra 2.2.38, the relation between Ishvara and prakriti cannot be established. In sutra 2.2.39, Ishvara’s status as overseer cannot be established either. In sutra 2.2.40, should someone say that Ishvara acts through instruments such as a body, then he would also come to have experience and the like, and his divinity would be destroyed. In sutra 2.2.41, in this way Ishvara would be either finite, that is, limited, or not all-knowing.

The doctrine of Vedanta differs from this. Brahman is both the efficient and the material cause, the maker of creation as well as its underlying substance.

In the Bhagavata-Pancharatra view, Samkarshana arises from Vasudeva, Pradyumna from Samkarshana, and Aniruddha from Pradyumna, and this is held to be the arising of the four vyuhas.

Badarayana answers in turn. In sutra 2.2.42, the arising of Samkarshana and the rest is not possible, since they are of the nature of the jiva, and the atman does not arise. In sutra 2.2.43, an instrument does not arise from an agent. In sutra 2.2.44, should someone say that these are parts of the lordly glory of knowledge and the like, then to that extent there is no conflict with the Upanishad. In sutra 2.2.45, there is mutual contradiction within this scheme of vyuhas.

Context: in Shankara’s view too, Vishnu is accepted as a form of Brahman. This refutation bears only on the logical incoherence of the Pancharatra scheme of vyuhas, and it does not touch devotion to the Lord.

The pada opens. Here Badarayana takes up the arising of these elements, space, air, fire, water, and earth, from Brahman.

Badarayana answers in turn. In sutra 2.3.1 the opponent says that space does not arise from Brahman, since it is nowhere heard of in shruti. In sutra 2.3.2, “अस्ति तु,” yet space does have an origin. In sutra 2.3.3, “गौण्यसम्भव,” if space is anywhere called eternal, that is in a secondary sense. In sutra 2.3.4, “शब्दात्,” Taittiriya 2.1.1 says it directly, “तस्माद्वा एतस्मादात्मन आकाशः सम्भूतः।” In sutra 2.3.5, this is a statement about one and the same Brahman, just as the word “ब्रह्म” carries one and the same meaning. In sutra 2.3.6, otherwise the promise of “एकविज्ञानेन सर्वविज्ञान,” knowing everything by knowing one thing, would be lost. In sutra 2.3.7, “यावद्विकारम्,” as long as there is modification there is division, as in the world.

Context: Taittiriya Upanishad 2.1.1, where the order in which the five elements arise from Brahman is described.

The reasoning of the previous adhikarana applies to air as well. “मातरिश्वा” means air, its ancient Vedic name. Air too arises from space, and ultimately from Brahman alone.

The opponent asks, did Brahman itself arise from something? Badarayana says, “असम्भव,” the origin of Brahman is impossible, because Brahman is being itself, and being does not arise from any prior cause.

This is the proof that Brahman is self-established and unborn. Brahman is its own ground.

“तेजः” means the fire element. The Upanishad says it plainly, “तस्मादेव वायोरग्निः” (Taittiriya 2.1.1), from that same air fire arose.

Water too arises from fire, and the final root is Brahman alone.

Earth too arises from water in this same sequence. The order of the five elements runs like this: air from space, fire from air, water from fire, and earth from water. This is the root statement of the Taittiriya.

At every step it is Brahman’s “अभिध्यान,” its will, that sets creation in motion. Throughout the entire sequence Brahman is the underlying substance.

The order of creation runs from space to earth, and the order of dissolution runs the reverse, from earth to space. The element that arose last is the first to merge back into its cause at dissolution. This is a natural coherence.

The opponent asks, do intellect and mind also fall within this sequence of elements? Badarayana says, “अविशेष,” counting them separately makes no difference, for they too arise along with their material elements.

The individual self does not arise. In sutra 2.3.16, the talk of birth and death that appears is “चराचर-व्यपाश्रय,” bound up with the body, and it is secondary. In sutra 2.3.17, shruti gives no account of the atman arising; it speaks of the atman’s eternity.

Context: Bhagavad Gita 2.20, “न जायते म्रियते वा कदाचित्,” the atman is never born and never dies.

The jiva is “ज्ञ,” a knower, conscious by nature. This refutes the Vaisheshika view, which holds the atman to be insentient by nature and calls consciousness a quality arising from the contact of the atman and the mind.

Reasoning too establishes the conscious nature of the jiva.

At the time of death, “उत्क्रान्ति,” departure from the body, “गति,” the journey to the other world, and “आगति,” the return, all of this happens to the jiva, as the Upanishads describe. In its going and returning the jiva travels and comes back by its own nature.

Context: Chandogya 5.10 (the doctrine of the five fires) and Brihadaranyaka 4.4 (the description of the hour of death).

What is the size of the jiva, atomic, that is, minute, or all-pervading? This is an old dispute. Shankara’s doctrine is this: in its essential nature the jiva is all-pervading and identical with Brahman, yet from the standpoint of the limiting adjunct it appears atomic.

Badarayana answers in turn. In sutra 2.3.22, statements of unity with Brahman such as “तत्त्वमसि” belong to “इतर-अधिकार,” the context of the liberated jiva, while the bound jiva is called atomic. In sutra 2.3.23, atomicity is known both from the words of shruti and from the measures of size. In sutra 2.3.24, “चन्दनवत्,” just as a dab of sandalwood paste is applied to one part of the body yet its coolness is felt throughout, so too the jiva, though it stays in one place, pervades the whole body through its quality of consciousness. In sutras 2.3.25 through 2.3.29, many sub-objections on this subject are resolved.

In sutra 2.3.30, “यावदात्म-भावित्व,” the limiting adjuncts that go with the jiva, that is, the body and the senses, last as long as the world of transmigration lasts, so there is no fault. In sutra 2.3.31, “पुंस्त्वादिवत्,” just as qualities like manhood, though already present, become manifest at the proper time, so too the qualities of the jiva. In sutra 2.3.32, should someone say that consciousness would then have to be either always found or never found, the answer is that this is regulated by “अन्यतर-नियम,” a rule that fixes one of the two.

The jiva is the agent, the doer of its own actions. Badarayana answers in turn. In sutra 2.3.33, the shastra, meaning its injunctions and prohibitions, has meaning only when there is an agent. In sutra 2.3.34, the teaching of “विहार,” of active conduct, depends on this. In sutra 2.3.35, “उपादान,” the taking up of instruments, is done by the agent. In sutra 2.3.36, in an action the jiva is designated as the agent. In sutra 2.3.37, like perception, this is not fixed. In sutra 2.3.38, it follows from the difference in powers. In sutra 2.3.39, the prescription of meditation and samadhi is also possible only because of this agency.

By the illustration of the carpenter: just as a carpenter has both his tools and his own limbs, and works with both, so too the jiva is the agent of action together with its instruments.

The jiva is the agent, yet it depends on “पर,” on Brahman. In sutra 2.3.41, “परात्,” the jiva receives its right to agency from Brahman, so shruti says. In sutra 2.3.42, “कृत-प्रयत्न-उपेक्ष,” Brahman takes into account the effort and action the jiva has performed and gives fruit accordingly. This is what keeps the order of prescribed and prohibited action meaningful.

The jiva is a part of Brahman. In sutra 2.3.43, shruti speaks in some places of difference and in others of non-difference, and the resolution comes through the word “अंश,” part. Some branches even call the jiva “दाश,” a fisherman, or “कितव,” a gambler, and this is in the context of the limiting adjunct.

In sutra 2.3.44, from the “मन्त्र-वर्ण” (the Purusha Sukta, “पादोऽस्य विश्वा भूतानि”), the whole world is only a single quarter of Brahman. In sutra 2.3.45, smriti confirms this as well (Gita 15.7, “ममैवांशो जीवलोके”). In sutra 2.3.46, yet Brahman is not stained by the jiva’s suffering in this way, just as the sun’s reflection is not touched by the disturbances of the water. In sutra 2.3.47, other smritis say the same. In sutra 2.3.48, the practice of injunction and prohibition is due to the connection with the body, as with fire and its flame and the like. In sutra 2.3.49, for this reason the joys and sorrows of different jivas do not mix with one another. In sutra 2.3.50, the jiva is Brahman’s “आभास,” its reflection, like the sun reflected in water.

Context: Bhagavad Gita 15.7, “ममैवांशो जीवलोके जीवभूतः सनातनः।”

Each jiva’s experience is regulated by its own adrishta, its store of accumulated karma. In sutra 2.3.51, the rule of adrishta. In sutra 2.3.52, the same holds for will and the like. In sutra 2.3.53, difference of location brings no difference among the jivas, since all are contained within Brahman.

The pada opens. Here the word “प्राण” is taken to mean the eleven senses, that is, the five organs of action, the five organs of knowledge, and the mind, together with the one chief prana.

In sutra 2.4.1, like space and the rest, the prana, meaning the senses, also arise from Brahman. In sutra 2.4.2, should someone call them eternal, that is in a secondary sense, or because they already exist within their cause. In sutra 2.4.3, this keeps intact the promise of “एकविज्ञानेन सर्वविज्ञान,” knowing everything by knowing one thing. In sutra 2.4.4, the shruti quoted earlier proves the same.

The organ of speech too arises from Brahman, through the medium of fire. “तत्-पूर्वकत्व,” meaning by the priority of the cause.

Mundaka 2.1.8 speaks of “सप्त प्राण,” that is, seven senses. The remaining senses are understood to be included within these.

The hands, the feet, the organ of speech, the anus, and the organ of generation, these are the five organs of action. These too arise from Brahman alone.

The senses are “अणु,” subtle, a part of the subtle body.

The chief prana, the vital air, is “श्रेष्ठ,” the foremost, the master of all the senses. It too arises from Brahman.

The opponent says, the chief prana is really just the air element, so why teach it separately? Badarayana answers. In sutra 2.4.10, the Upanishad teaches it separately from air. In sutra 2.4.11, like the eye and the rest, being mentioned alongside air does not make it identical with air. In sutra 2.4.12, “अकरणत्व,” the chief prana is not a sense organ, so there is no fault.

The chief prana has five functions: prana, the intake of breath; apana, elimination; samana, digestion; udana, upward movement; and vyana, circulation through the whole body. In sutra 2.4.14 these too are called “अणु,” subtle.

Each sense has a presiding deity, as the sun presides over the eye, the directions over the ear, the moon over the mind, and fire over speech. In sutra 2.4.16, the senses hold this connection with a deity only in a “प्राणवान” jiva, one possessed of prana, as is known from the words of shruti.

The eternity of the chief prana, because it rests on Brahman.

The opponent says, all the senses are only modifications of the chief prana. Badarayana answers. In sutra 2.4.18, these “इन्द्रियाणि” are distinct from the chief prana. In sutra 2.4.19, shruti states their difference. In sutra 2.4.20, “वैलक्षण्य,” there is a clear difference in their functions.

Chandogya 6.3 through 6.5 gives the doctrine of “त्रिवृत्करण”: from the mixing of these three, fire, water, and food, all objects are formed. In sutra 2.4.21, “संज्ञा-मूर्ति-क्लृप्ति,” the making of name and form comes from this. In sutra 2.4.22, flesh and the like are formed from the earth-dominant portion, and for the remaining objects too the same rule applies, according to the words of shruti.

The conclusion of the book, where the doubled word marks that the book has ended. “वैशेष्यात्,” it is because of their distinct properties that the senses and the rest are stated separately, and “तद्वादः तद्वादः,” this same doctrine is affirmed once more.

Next begins the third book (Sadhana), where the means to the direct realization of Brahman will be considered.